President Ruto’s corruption claims shows graft is part of govt

In mid-August 2025, President William Ruto accused Parliament of corruption, alleging that committees routinely accept bribes to pass bills and influence the impeachment of governors. Although the President offered no documentary evidence, his claims cannot be dismissed outright and they are far from new.

Bribery and patronage have long been used by successive presidents to secure legislative loyalty, push through unpopular laws, shield allies, or weaken oversight. Tracing this history reveals that corruption in Kenya’s legislature stems less from individual misconduct than from structural incentives tied to the exercise and preservation of executive power. Over time, Parliament has exhibited recurring weaknesses that lend weight to such accusations.

The conduct of many MPs can be likened to a person of short stature who resents being called a dwarf, insisting instead that he is simply short yet when measured, the reality is undeniable. In the same way, MPs may deny being corrupt, but their actions tell another story.

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This article highlights six examples that demonstrate Parliament’s failings, revealing not just occasional lapses, but covert compromise on parliament’s independence. These actions in the long run erode the August House credibility, and its role as the people’s representative, carry grave economic and democratic consequences and may be responsible for people’s willingness to break taboo and celebrate death of politicians and their families.

Passing of Unpopular Bills Against Public Will

Democracy is not just about elections and representation; it is also the foundation of economic freedom. According to the 2025 Index of Economic Freedom, Kenya scored 54.8, placing it in the “Mostly Unfree” category. This is below the global average of 58.6. The score reflects constrained economic freedom, marked by weak rule of law, substantial political interference in the courts, and only marginal progress in reforming public finance management.

When Parliament abdicates its constitutional role, it denies citizens both political voice and economic opportunity. The passage of the Finance Bill 2024 is a perfect example: MPs voted overwhelmingly in favour despite widespread public opposition. This not only undermined Article 10 on public participation but also imposed punitive taxes that squeezed household incomes, raised the cost of doing business, and triggered youth-led protests. Here, weak democracy directly translated into diminished economic freedom.

The Bill framed as a revenue-sharing measure, it introduced new taxes projected to raise an additional Ksh. 302 Billion in revenue compared to the previous year. Among other unpopular measures, this legislation established a housing levy that requires salaried Kenyans to pay 1.5% of their gross monthly salary, with employers forced to match this amount. Despite strong opposition during public participation, massive street protests and even the Gen-Zs storming the National Assembly in June 2024, Members of Parliament many facing allegations of inducement by the Executive voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Bill.

The economic context made the move even more questionable: Kenya’s per capita income was only USD 2,200 (2024) and the poverty rate stood at 40% (2022). Yet MPs argued that the country’s tax-to-GDP ratio was low and needed raising, ignoring that this measure would make citizens poorer while undermining business profits and so harming employment.

This pattern of passing unpopular laws is not new. From the Social Health Insurance Act, 2023 which birthed Social Health Authority (SHA) is burdensome to many Kenyans because of its mandatory deductions without a clear guarantee of quality and accessible healthcare; to the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014, which curtailed civil liberties, to repeated attempts to weaken independent commissions, Parliament has repeatedly acted as an extension of the Executive with some members of the Civil Society Organisations arguing that the legislature is weaker than it has been at any time since the reintroduction of multiparty elections.

Compromised Vetting and Approval of Public Officials

It is common knowledge that the nomination of candidates for some state jobs is heavily influenced by political convenience and patronage rather than the ability and qualifications of the individuals concerned. It is disturbing that this trend is also extending to the National Assembly where they have turned the vetting process into a transactional ritual, confirming the President’s suggestion that committees are open to inducements.

Chapter six of the Constitution lays bare that only people of integrity and accountability should hold public office. It also assigns Parliament the critical role of vetting nominees for key public positions, ensuring competence and ethical standing. In practice, however, this process has often been compromised. Former Speaker, JB Muturi admitted that MPs openly asked him for money during vetting for the position of CS for Public Service, and he further said that MPs receive kick-backs to skew or shoot down reports.

Parliament has often been criticised for shielding politicians and approving them for state jobs without rigorously interrogating their academic credentials. A broader example of this weakness is reflected in cases such as Aisha Jumwa (former CS Gender) whose degree from JKUAT was repeatedly challenged. Despite the persistent doubts, she was allowed to hold public office, illustrating how questions of academic integrity are frequently overlooked in Kenya’s political system. The approval and appointment of persons with integrity issues, questionable character, and shaky intellectual and academic backgrounds sums up conduct of Kenya’s Parliament and disappointment in governance and leadership.

Surrendering Budgetary Oversight to the Executive

Constitutionally, Parliament is delegated the legislative and oversight functions of public finance. Parliament is also mandated to monitor and oversight the executive in the economic management of the country. Yet it has increasingly ceded this role to the National Treasury, becoming a rubber stamp for the Executive’s fiscal priorities.

Section 50(5) of the PFM Act requires Parliament to set a debt ceiling. Legal Notice No. 34 of 2015 further directs that this ceiling be reviewed annually. For a country like Kenya, where public debt is already high and fiscal sustainability is fragile, adopting fiscal rules with legislated debt limits is critical for medium-term consolidation. Yet Kenya’s soaring public debt, as at May 2025 was Ksh. 11.5 trillion shows Parliament’s abdication of this duty. Time and again, MPs have approved higher borrowing ceilings without interrogating sustainability. In 2023, their decision to raise the ceiling effectively handed the National Treasury a blank cheque, despite repeated warnings from the Auditor-General and the Parliamentary Budget Office about fiscal risks.

Section 31 (2) also gives powers to parliament to request and receive reports on loans made to the national government when debating matters relating to public debt. However, the “request” provision has been weakened as the balance of power leans towards the executive; parliament seldom receives the requests in full and the information on public debt is never fully disclosed by the executive. Parliament simply forgot its job and whose brief it holds in that House. The principle of Separation of powers doesn’t exist; checks and balances have been reduced to a mere rumour.

Clinging to Unconstitutional Funds (CDF and NGAAF) Despite Court Rulings

In early July 2025, Kenya’s Parliament passed a constitution amendment bill seeking to enshrine three controversial funds in the Constitution: The Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the National Government Affirmative Action Fund (NGAAF), and a newly passed Senate Oversight Fund (SOF). While its proponents claim the amendment will stabilize development financing, critics argue it aims to shield politically controlled funds from legal scrutiny. In 2015 and again in 2022, civil society organizations successfully challenged the legality of the CDF in court. The Judiciary found the fund unconstitutional, ruling that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers by allowing MPs to usurp functions reserved for the executive.

The CDF and NGAAF, both long criticized for weak accountability, have enabled legislators, whose core mandate is to represent, legislate, and oversee, to implement local development projects directly. This dual role creates inherent conflicts of interest and undermines fiscal oversight. The proposed Senate Oversight Fund adds another troubling dimension. While senators are constitutionally mandated to oversee county governments, creating a fund they directly control introduces a structural conflict of interest. The entrenchment of unconstitutional funds like CDF and NGAAF further illustrates how political capture distorts economic freedoms.

In reality, these funds often serve as political tools. For instance, in Bonchari, MP Charles Onchoke’s aide was caught on camera handing out cash inside Nyangena Catholic Church, raising suspicion that NG-CDF money was being used for political influence. By clinging to these funds, Parliament not only undermines devolution but also weakens the very principle of checks and balances that underpins the Constitution.

Senate’s Abuse of Impeachment as a Cash Cow

The Senate is no stranger to controversy, especially regarding allegations that Senators have been compromised or even extorted money to influence impeachment outcomes. In several high-profile cases, whispers of cash changing hands have overshadowed the constitutional process, raising doubts about whether decisions are based on evidence of abuse of office or on political deals. Such conduct undermines the Senate’s mandate to safeguard devolution and hold governors accountable, turning impeachment into a bargaining tool rather than a tool of accountability. The removal of Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko in 2020 was clouded by claims that Senators received Ksh. 2 million each to back the motion. In more recent cases, Senators have alleged offers of up to Ksh. 10 million to influence outcomes, including in the impeachment of former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua.

Where sufficient legal grounds exist, due process should guide outcomes. Instead, impeachment has increasingly become a bargaining chip, eroding the legislature’s independence and the credibility of a critical accountability mechanism.

Refusal to Declare Wealth – A Symptom of Deeper Rot

Finally, the refusal of many MPs and Senators to declare their wealth publicly reflects a culture of opacity and impunity. The Leadership and Integrity Act requires state officers to declare their income, assets, and liabilities. Yet Parliament has resisted calls for full public disclosure, often citing “privacy” concerns. Wealth declarations are a proven anti-corruption tool. In South Africa, MPs’ assets are publicly accessible. In Kenya, by contrast, secrecy fuels suspicion. The lavish lifestyles of many legislators; luxury cars, properties, and foreign holidays sit uneasily against their official salaries.

President Ruto’s hands may not be clean, but his accusations against Parliament echo a troubling reality. Over the years, Parliament has passed unpopular laws, compromised the vetting of officials, surrendered its budgetary oversight, defied court rulings, monetised impeachment, and resisted wealth transparency. These patterns weaken democracy, burden citizens, and erode trust in institutions. Unless Parliament reforms itself, Kenya risks sliding into executive authoritarianism with a legislature complicit in eroding accountability.

Oscar Ochieng is a communications practitioner @JOChieng85 and Jairus Kedogo is a Political Analyst @OmendaKedogo